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ARMED VESSELS
H. M. SUBMARINE "E-14"
([1920] A. C. 403)

ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND
Prize court-Prize bounty-Destruction of enemy transport-Enemy
"armed ship"-Naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25),
section 42
An order in council of March 2, 1915, made pursuant to section 42
of the naval prize act, 1864, provided for the payment of
prize bounty to such of the officers and crew of any of H.
M.'s ships of war as were present at the taking or destroying
of any "armed.ship" of the enemy.
In May, 1915, a British submarine torpedoed and sank a Turkish
transport having on board 6,000 Turkish troops, who had
with them rifles and ammunition, also six field guns so disposed on the ship's deck that, at suitable ranges, they could
have been used with effect against the submarine. The
ship was a Turkish fleet auxiliary manned by naval ratings
and commanded by Turkish naval officers; she carried as
part of her regular equipment a few light quick-firing guns.
The officers and crew of the submarine applied to the prize
court for prize bounty:
Held, that the meaning of the words "armed ship" in section 42
was not limited to a ship commissioned and armed for the
purpose of offensive action in a naval engagement, and that
the applicants were entitled to prize bounty under the order
in council.
Judgment of the prize court reversed.

Present: Lord Sumner, Lord Parmoor, 'rhe Lord Justice Clerk, and Sir Arthur Channell.
Appeal from judgments of the admiralty division (in
prize) dated February 21, 1917,1 and November 25, 1918. 2
The officers and crew of H. M.'s submarine E-14 by a
motion in the prize court sought a declaration that they
were entitled to £31,375 as prize bounty for the destruction of the Turkish transport Guj Djeml on May 10, 1915.
The prize bounty was claimed under an order in council
of March 2, 1915, made in pursuance of section 42 of thP
naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), 'vhich refers
to the destruction of any "armed ship" of the enemy.
1(1917]P.85.

2

Unreported.
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The president (Sir Samuel Evans), by a judgment
delivered on February 21, 1917, held that the meaning of
the 'vords ''armed ship" in section 42 was "a fighting
unit of the fleet, a ship commissioned and armed for the
purpose of offensive action in a naval engagement." He
found that the evidence before him did not bring the Guj
Djemal within that description and dismissed the application, but 'vithout prejudice to the claimants renewing it
upon any further evidence that might be forthcoming.
The motion was renewed before the president (Lord
Sterndale) on November 25,. 1918, further evidence being
adduced. The effect of the evidence given upon the t'vo
applications appears from the judgment of their lordships.
Lord Stern dale, P., considered that he was not at liberty
to depart from the principles laid do"rn in the decision
above referred to, and held that the fresh evidence did not
render the transport an "armed ship" within those principles. The motion was accordingly dismissed.
ror
October 21, 1919. Sir Erle Richards, K. C., and G. P.
Langton for the claimants: Prize bounty was payable
under the order in council, since upon the evidence the
Guj Djemal was an "armed ship" of the enemy. There is
nothing in the acts in force before the naval prize act,
1864, nor in the decisions, which indicates that the meaning of the plain words used should be limited as held in
the prize court. [Reference was made to Several Dutch
Schuyts/ 3 L' Alerte~· 4 La Olorinde)· 5 The Sedulous/ 6 6
Anne, c. 13, s. 8; 43 Geo. 3, c. 160, s. 37; 45 Geo. 3, c.72,
s. 5; 17 and 18 Viet. c. 18, ss. 3, 11.] Prize bounty has been
awarded under the order in council for the sinking of
ships not coming within the principle applied in the
present case-namely, a patrol ship and an armed mine
layer: See H. M. Submarine E-11, 7 and The Konigen
Luise. 8
for
Sir Gordon Hewart, A. G., and J. G. Pease for the
respondent, the procurator general. The view of the
late President as to the meaning of the words "armed
ship" was right. The reference in section to "the beginning of the engagement" and the basis upon which the
a (1805) 6 C. Rob. 48.
• (1806) 6 C. Rob. 238.
e (1814) 1 Dod. 436.

a (1813) 1 Dod. 253 . .
7 Lloyd's List, June 26, 1916.
• Lloyd's List, Feb. 27, 1917.

SUBMARINE E-14:

bounty is to be computed indicate that what \Vas 1neant
was a fighting unit of a fleet. In. the unreported cases
in which during the present war prize-bounty has been
awarded for the destruction of patrol ships, minelayers,
or arn1ed auxiliary ships, the point that the order in
council did not apply '\Vas not taken.
December 3. The judgment of their lordships \Vas
delivered by-Lord SuMNER: In this appeal the commander, officers and crew of H. M.'s submarine E-14
seek, pursuant to 27 and 28 Viet. c. 25, s. 42, and the
order in council dated March 2, 1915, to establish their
right to a grant of £5 per head of the 6,000 Turkish
troops, and of the 200 ship's complement, who were on
board of the Guj Djemal, \Vhen they destroyed her with
a torpedo in the Sea of Marmora, near Kalolimno Island, on May 10, 1915. The troops had their rifles and
ammunition, and with them were six Krupp 75-mm.
field· guns, also with ammunition, and so disposed on
the ship's deck astern that at suitable ranges they could
have been used against the E-14 with effect. The ship
herself was part of the Ottoman naval force, a fleet
auxiliary manned by naval ratings and commanded by
officers of the Navy of the Sublime Porte, and she carried
a few light quick-firing guns as part of her regular
equipment, with which she could defend herself if necessary. At the time in question she was acting as a
troop transport, and this would appear to have been her
regular employment. She was on her way to the
Dardanelles, and it was known to the Turkish Government that British submarines had passed up the straits
for the purpose, among others, of interfering with that
traffic.
By section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, the right
in question would attach if the Guj Djemal was, in the
words of the section, "an armed ship of any of His
Majesty's enemies." This is entirely a matter of construction of the section in its application to the facts
of this case, and no other question \Vas raised in the
appeal. Little assistance, if any, is ·to be derived from
prior decisions or earlier legislation. No decision before
the war turned on or touched this section, and in the
cases decided during the war the present contention had
not been raised. The older acts go back for many generations. At one time the number of guns, and not of men
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carried by the ship destroyed, was the measure of the
grant, and until the Crimean War the expression, "armed
ship, " was not used. No settled practice was shown to
have existed in the grant of "head money," as it was
called, that could be regarded as affecting the ordinary
meaning of the words of the section, and no reasons of
policy were suggested, which would point to an intention
to use those words in one sense rather than in another.
It is plain on the facts that the Guj Djemal was a. ship,
and a large one; that she was a ship of His Majesty's
enemies, a unit in the Turkish fleet; and that she "ras
armed. If then these single and undisputed facts are
put together, she was in fact " an armed ship of His
Majesty's enemies." Why was she not so within section 42 ~ It is true that she was used to transport troops.
It is true also that she got no chance to use her arms,
or at least none that Turkish troops or seamen were
minded to take; such is the nature of an injury by a
well-placed torpedo. It is true that she did not go forth
to battle, nor was she in any case fit to lie in the line,
but the section says nothing about this. It may be that
her regular service consisted in carrying troops and
stores and that her combatant capacity was not high, but
it can hardly be doubted that, if a suitable opportunity
had occurred, it would have been her duty to fight and
even to attack a hostile submarine.
The contention presented on behalf of the Crown was,
that her main character was that of a transport, and
that the fact that she was armed "\Vas only an incident.
The section, however, does not distinguish between the
purposes for which the armed ship is armed, nor does it
confer or withhold the grant according as the armament
carried is the main or an incidental characteristic of the
enemy sovereign's ship. The contention prevailed 'vith
the late president, who gave effect to it in the following
words: 9 "An armed ship, "\Vi thin the meaning of the
section to be construed, is a fighting unit of the fleet, a
ship commissioned and armed for the purpose of offensive
action in a naval engagement."
Evidently this proposition is open to several objections.
It makes the rights of His Majesty's forces depend on
the purpose "\vith "\vhich his enemies may have dispatched
their vessel, on 'vhat either 'vay is a vrarlike service. It
Q

[1917], pp. 85, 89.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

employs a term, ''offensive action," which, in practice,
is of indefinite meaning, and in any case involves an
inquiry into the state of mind of the hostile commander.
Sir Samuel Evans elucidated his meaning thus in another
passage: ''In my opinion, if it were proved that she
carried a few light guns, that would not constitute her
an armed ship any more than a merchant vessel armed
for self defense; nor v:ould the fact that she carried
troops armed with rifles and some field guns and other
ammunition intended to be used after the landing of the
troops.''
Their lordships are unable to accept these propositions.
Of the case of a merchant ship they say nothing, for this
is a question on the meaning of the words "ship of the
enemy," and the appellants did not contend, nor needed
they to do so, that any ship but one in state service would
be covered by those words. There is again no evidence
that the rifles and field pieces were not intended to be
used at sea under any circumstances, little as any occasion
for their use was to be looked for, and it must be recollected that defense is not confined to taking to one's
heels or even to returning a blo\v, but, in the jargon of
strategy, may consist in an offensive-defensive, or in
plain words in hitting first. No criteria would more
embarrass the application of the enactment than these,
and to introduce the test of the ship's commission is to
introduce something which involves a rewriting of the
section.
Their lordships are of opinion that the \Vords of the section are plain, and that the facts fit them, and accordingly
the appellants are entitled to succeed; that the decree
appealed against should be set aside; and that this appeal
should be allowed with costs, and that the case should be
remitted to the prize court to make such formal decree
in favor of the appellants as may be required. Their
lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN
MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-15 (H. M. S. "ESPIEGLE" AND·
OTHER VESSELS)
([1923], p. 149)

Prize court-Prize bounty-" Armed ship" of the enemy-Lighters·
carrying troops-Estimate of numbers of persons on board-Naval
prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), s. 42
By an order in council of March 2, 1915, which put into operation
section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, prize bounty at the·
rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship wa;:;.
payable to such of the officer and crew of any of His Majes-ty's ships of war as were present at the taking or destroying.
of any "armed ship" of the enemy:
lleld, applying the principles stated in H. M. sub1narine E. 14 [1920]
A. C. 403, that it was not necessary for the ship herself to
carry any armament structurally attached to her, and that
enemy lighters carrying troops armed with rifles were
"armed ships" within the meaning of the section.
No accurate figures being available to establish the numbers of the·
persons on board the enemy vessels, the court, believing the·
claimants' estimate to have been made with the intention
of accuracy, accepted it.

Motion for an award of prize bounty in accordance
with the provisions of section 42 of the naval prize act,
1864 (put into operation by an order in council of March
2, 1915), on behalf of Capt. Wilfrid Nunn, R.N., and theofficers and ships' companies of various sloops, launches,
and other craft, as being present at the capture or destruction of the armed Turkish vessels set out in the fol ....
lowing schedule:

Name of II. M. S.
engaged

Date of
capture or
destruction

Name of enemy vessel
captured or destroyed

R. M.
Espiegle _____ Nov: 9, 1914 _____
Turkish
river gunboat_ ___
do ____________________
Dos._______________
Do _______________ Nov. 19,1914
rurklsh
Marmaris.
H. M.S. Odin _________
Turkish armed v esse 1s
l\riosul and Bulbul.
1915.
H. M.S. Clio _________
7 armed Turkish barges ____
H. M.S.
Shaitan ______
7 armed Turkish mahelas __
Do _______________
II. M.S. Comet _______
vessel
Sebah. Turkish
H. M.S. Sumarra _____
Armed Turkish vessel
Samarra.
June 3,1915
Armed Turkish lighter ____
H. 11. S. Lewis Pelly __
II.M. S. L. 3 _________
3 other armed Turkish
lighters.
3 armed horse boats ___
H. M.S. Shushan ____ July 24,1915 Turkish river gunboat_ ___
Total ___________

Number Amount
of perof prize
sons on bounty
board
at £5
enemy per
head
vessel
12
12
66

£60
60
330

230
32
1 714
1 315

1, 150·
1603,570
1,575

gunboat

'June Iand 2,

I

1

I

rmed

1
I

20

100

26

130

300
300

1,500
1, 500·

12

60

------------·-- ----------------------------,----------1

I

At least.
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OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA

The facts are fully set out in the judgment.
The claim was resisted by the Crown on the ground
that the vessels were destr'oyed in the course of joint
naval and military operations. It was also contended
that as it appeared from the claimants' affidavits that
some of the enemy vessels were lighters and mahelas not
fitted with any armament, the mere fact that they were
carrying troops armed with rifles was insufficient to make
them "armed" vessels within the meaning of section 42
Df the naval prize act. The point was further taken that
no accurate evidence was available as to the number of
persons on board the enemy vessels.
Wilfrid Lewis for the claimants.
C. W. Lilley for the procurator general.
[In the course of the arguments it was con tended that
the decision of the privy council in H. M. submarine
E. 14 10 was not an authority for the proposition that a
lighter carrying armed men was an ''armed ship." Lord
Sumner, in mentioning "troops armed with rifles," was
merely going through the various sorts of armaments
held by Sir Samuel Evans in the court below as being
insufficient, in his opinion, to constitute an "armed ship";
and Lord Sumner, dealing with the qualifications as a
whole, said that their lordships were unable to accept
those propositions. In fact the troopship sunk by the
E. 14 had several light field guns on board.]
March 5. The President (Sir Henry Duke) read the
following judgment: These are a series of claims for
prize bounty under the provisions of the naval prize act,
1864, section 42, on behalf of Capt. Wilfrid Nunn, R. N.,
and the officers and crews of various sloops, launches,
and a~med horse boats in His Majesty's service which
'vere engaged during 1914 and 1915 in operations on the
River Tigris and Euphrates against naval forces of the
Ottoman Empire.
Prize bounty is payable under section 42 by distribution among such of the officers and crews of any of His
Majesty's ships of war as are actually present at the
taking or destruction of any armed ship of any of His
Majesty's enemies of a sum calculated at the rate of £5
for each person on board the enemy's ship at the beginning of the engagement. By section 2 of the statute
the term "ship of war of I-Iis Majesty" includes any
vessel of 'var of His Majesty and any hired armed ship or
10

[1920] A. C. 403.
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vessel in His Majesty's service. Captain Nunn, as
senior naval officer of the Persian Gulf division of the
East Indies station, had under his command at the time
of the various operations here in question a diversity of
vessels, including horse boats, but there is no dispute
that all the claimants' vessels come under the description
of ships and vessels of His Majesty which are included
in the provisions of section 42.
or The operations for which prize bounty is claimed are
the sinking and destruction of a Turkish river gunboat
on November 9, 1914, by H. M.S. Espiegle near Muhammarch, on the Tigris, at a point distant some 40 or 45
miles from the river mouth; the sinking on November
19, 1914, by the Espiegle some miles farther up the
Tigris of a Turkish gunboat, which 'vas salved and became H. M. S. Flycatcher; the sinking of the Turkish
gunboat Marmaris and capture of the steam vessels
Bulbul and Mosul and the capture of numerous barges
and mahelas on June 1 and 2, 1915, in the Tigris upriver
from the junction of the Tigris '3.nd the Euphrates at
Qurnah; the capture on June 3, 1915, at Amarah, son1e
90 miles upriver beyond Qurnah, of various steam vessels and lighters; and the destruction on July 24, 1915,
at N asiriyah on the Euphrates, some 120 miles beyond
Basra, of a Turkish river gunboat. The distances I
have stated, which are roughly estimated, indicate the
extent of Captain Nunn's field of operations.
The questions raised at the hearing 'vere 'vhether the ·
capture and destruction of the various vessels in respect of
which the claims arise were effected solely by the respective claimants or were joint operations of naval and military forces; whether the ships and vessels captured and
destroyed were "armed," within the meaning of the term
as used in section 42 ;~and vvhat are the numbers in respect
of which, if at all, these claims for prize bounty ought to
be allowed.
The duty of the naval forces in Mesopotamia in course
of which the vessels under consideration vvere captured
or sunk was that of cooperation with the n1ilitary expeditionary force under the immediate command of Gen.
Sir Charles Townshend. Apart fron1 this general duty
Captain Nunn, as senior naval officer, was under the
orders of the commander in chief on the East Indies station and of the board of admiralty.

JOINT MILIT:ARY ACTION

The claims made in respect of the sinking on November
9, 1914, of a Turkish gunboat off Muhammareh Island,
the sinking on November 19, 1914, of another gunboat
higher up the Tigris, the sinking on June 1, 1914, of the
gunboat Marraaris, and the sinking on July 24, 1915, of
an unidentified gunboat on the Euphrates were not disputed at the hearing.
The allegation on the part of the Treasury that the
events out of which the claims arise 'vere joint acts of
military and naval forces depended upon the scheme of
the operations in which the same occurred and the terms
in which the incidents themselves were described in military dispatches, the pronouns "'ve" and "ours" being
used as to each of them, though without anything of a
precise nature to indicate that th~ language employed
was used with regard to things actually done by troops
as distinguished from naval forces. The issue here
depends upon ascertaining what was in fact done. At
the end of May, 1915, when the Turkish forces retreated
from Qurnah toward Basra, a combined advance of
British troops and naval forces took place which covered
the period of the disputed claims. The naval forces during this time reconnoitered for the army, conducted the
transport operations when river transport was used, and
from time to time successfully engaged Turkish naval
forces and overtook and captured various vessels which
were conveying Turkish troops and munitions-inclusive
of field guns, bombs, mines, rifles, and ammunition. Sir
Charles Townshend was, at material times, with an officer
of his staff, on board whatever vessel was being used by
the senior naval officer as his flagship, and other military
officers were distributed among other vessels in the command. The bridge of the flagship commanded the surrounding country, and the general used it for purposes of
observation. His communication 'vith his forces 'vas to
some extent maintained by wireless telegraphy from the
flagship. He was kept informed· of what was being done
under Captain Nunn's command, but he did not direct
and he took no part in the operations of the naval force.
On board one of the vessels was a detachment of an
English regiment which had been detailed for service
under naval command and 'Yhich acted in the capacity
of marines. The advance beyond Basra to A1narah 'vas
one in 'vhich the army and navy closely cooperated, and
I believe the kno,vledge that troops 'vere advancing was
an inducement to the surrender by Turkish forces of some
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of the captured craft. But no troops were upon the scene
when any of the sinkings and captures in question were
carried out, and I am of opinion, upon like grounds of
principle to those which I stated in the somewhat similar
case of The Sulman Palc, 11 that these several sinkings and
captures were solely effected by the respective claimants.
vessels.
The question whether the lighters and mahelas in
question were armed vessels is perhaps not directly
covered by H. M. submarine E-14, 10 to which reference
was made, but guidance is to be found there which helps
in its determination. On behalf of the Crown it was
submitted that only the gunboats manned by Turkish
naval forces were ''armed vessels," so as to be the
subject of claims for prize bounty. The material fact
with regard to the lighters and mahelas here in question
is that they were conveying armed troops who had at
their disposal on board these vessels an abundance of
weapons capable of being used for the destruction of His
Majesty's ships and vessels which were in action against
them. These troops with the weapons at their disposal
could without any exceptional display of skill or courage
have put out of action most, if not all, of the claimants.
The substance of the question, as it was presented to me,
was whether vessels so provided as these craft were must
be excluded from the category of armed vessels by reason
of the fact that they were not built for combatant action
and had not at the time of their capture any armament
which was structurally attached to them. Inasmuch as
the several vessels were ships of the enemy, and in each
instance carried troops "armed, or provided with arms,''·
with which they could have fought and destroyed His
Majesty's vessels (by which in fact they were destroyed
or captured), I must decide this question in favor of the
claimants.
No accurate figures are available to establish the
numbers of the persons who were on board the several
enemy vessels described in the claim at the beginning of
the various engagements. It is a matter of estimate,
and, as I believe the estimate of the claimants to have
been made with the intention of accuracy, I accept it.
There will accordingly be awards in favor of the several
claimants of the amounts stated in the schedule to the
notice of motion. That will be a total award of £10,500.
10

[1920] A. C. 403.

11

[1922], p. 73.

DESTRUCTTON OF TURKISH VESSELS

IN THE MATTER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN
ARMED TURKISH VESSELS (H. M. SUBMARINE ttE. 12")
([1924], p. 29)

Prize court-Prize bounty-Armed vessels carrying munitions of
war-Destruction of small Turkish sailing vessels-Armed ships
of the enemy-Naval prize act, 1864 (27 and 28 Viet. c. 25), s. 42
Acting on the instructions of the naval commander in chief, the
claimants, the officers and crew of a British submarine,
sank by gunfire a number of small Turkish sailing vessels
engaged in carrying munitions of war to the Turkish military
bases and arsenals in the Sea of Marmora.
The vessels did not carry any armament structurally attached to
them, but their crews were armed with rifles and, on each
occasion when attacked, the crews took to their boats, got
ashore, and opened fire on the submarine with their rifles.
By an order in council of March 2, 1915, which put into operation
section 42 of the naval prize act, 1864, prize bounty at the
rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship is
payable to such of the officers and crew of any of His
Majesty's ships of war as are present at the taking or
destroying of any armed ship of the enemy:
Held, that the inference to be drawn from the facts that the commander of the submarine had instructions to sink sailing
craft of the sort in question and that in each case the crews,
instead of scattering and making their escape, opened fire
on the submarine, was that these sailing vessels had been
taken under the control of the Turkish administration, and
were not to be regarded merely as merchant vessels in
private ownership engaged in the carriage of contraband.
They were therefore ships of the enemy within the meaning
of section 42.
Held, further, that the vessels were armed ships when they were
attacked, and that it would give too restricted an operation
to the rights provided by the statute to hold that they had
ceased to be armed ships because their crews with their
rifles had left before the vessels were actually destroyed.
The claimants, therefore, were entitled to an award of
prize bounty.

Motion for an award of prize bounty in accordance
with the provisions of section 42 of the naval prize act,
1864.

The claimants, Commander Bruce, D. S. 0., R. N.,
and the officers and crew of H. M. submarine E. 12,
claimed declarations that they were entitled to a'va.rds
of prize bounty in respect of the destruction in the Sea
of Marmora, on September 21, 1915, of six rrurkish
sailing vessels with a complement of 30 men; and on
October 5, 1915, of a steamship and 15 sailing vessels
with a total complement of 70 men.
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The question at issue was whether the sailing vessels
were to be regarded as ordinary merchant vessels engaged
in run 1ing contraband cargoes or as armed ships of the
enemy within the meaning of section 42 of the naval
prize act, 1864.
'1'he facts are summarized in the headnote and are fully
set out in the judgment.
for
Wilfrid Lewis for the claimants: The evidence in the
possession of the commander in chief showed that vessels
of this type were being employed by the Turkish naval
authorities for the carriage of munitions of \Var; and it is
immaterial whether th~y were state owned or merely chartered by the state. Their crews carried rifles, and the
vessels therefore were armed ships within the meaning of
section 42 of the naval prize act: In the Matter of the
Naval Operations in Mesopotamia, 1914-15. 12 If they
were armed ships, however, it is submitted that they
would come within the section even if they were owned by
subjects of the enemy state. This question was left open
by Lord Sumner in H. M. submarine E. 14. 13 Although
fire was opened from the shore, at the beginning of the
engagement the vessels were armed, notwithstanding that
the rifles then on board were not fired till a later stage.
for
Hilbery for the procurator general: These vessels were
merely suspected of carrying munitions of war for the
Turkish forces. There is no evidence that these small
sailing craft were in the regular service of the enemy state
or even that they had been pressed into that service.
They would appear to have been ordinary merchant craft
running contraband cargoes. Further, they were not
armed ships when sunk or destroyed, and on that ground
the case is distinguishable from In the Matter of the Naval .
Operations in Jlfesopotamia, 1914-15. 12
or
October 19. The PRESIDENT (Sir Henry Duke):
These claims arise out of the action of H. M. submarine
E. 12, which was detailed to enter the Sea of Marmora on
various occasions when the approach \vas closed by naval
defenses of the kind which during the war became familiar.
The mere achievement of the passage into the Sea of
Marmora conferred much distinction on the officers and
men concerned, who had made a series of incursions
before the raids no\v under consideration.
t2

[1923] P. 149.

13

[1920] A. C. 403

DESTRUCTION

By September, 1915, acting on the information in his
possession, Admiral de Robeck, who was in command,
gave personal instructions to Commander Bruce that
there 'vere certain classes of vessels with which he was to
-deal. I am satisfied that the commander acted on those
instructions, and that so acting he destroyed and sank the
vessels in respect of which the present claim is made.
1.'here is a claim in respect of the destruction on September 21 of what are described as 6 armed Turkish sailing
vessels, and a claim in respect of an operation on October
5, where the service alleged to have been rendered is the
-destruction or sinking of an armed Turkish steamer and 15
armed Turkish sailing vessels. The sailing vessels, as far
as the information before me goes, were vessels customarily engaged in time of peace in commercial business
in the Sea of Marmora; normally they were commercial
'Sailing craft, and were said to be at the time in question
·e ngaged in carrying 'arious munitions of war. I have
no doubt that they ·were so engaged. The positions
in which they were found-in one case returning appar·e ntly from a trip to Panderma, where there were munition
factories and arsenals, nnd on the other occasion going to
or from Rodosto, where there were works used for military
purposes by the Turkish authorities-make the character
of their enterprise fairly clear, and they might ha.v e been
captured as being vessels engaged in carrying contraband of war.
But that does not dispose of this question. In some of
the evidence there was a disposition to lay much stress on
the fact that these vessels were engaged in carrying
munitions of war; but that fact does not by any means
constitute them armed vessels of the enemy. Even if
these were vessels carrying munitions of war, and having
arms on board and using them, the strong impression on
my mind is that those facts would not be sufficient
to constitute them armed vessels of the enemy.
Commander Bruce and his brother officer, Lieutenant
Commander Fox, gave evidence, and Commander Bruce
told me the instructions which he received. Before he
got these orders there was reason to suppose that a submarine venturing near certain classes of craft in the S ea
of Marmora, and neighboring "\Vaters, "'"ould be exceedingly likely to find herself sunk by gunfire, or a b omb,
or by other fire if she were in a position in 'vhich gunfire
was not practicable. rrhe vessels in question lnight 'veil
have engaged submarine E. 12 'vith success.
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On September 21, 1915, Commander Bruce says he
sighted six sailing vessels, and chased them into a small
bay near Panderma. The cre\vs, numbering four or five
in each vessel, abandoned their ships and fled to the
shore, and immediately opened fire upon E. 12 \Vith
rifles at a range of about 1,000 yards, and he says he
sank the six.
On October 5 the E.12 sighted a small enemy steamer
and 17 enemy sailing vessels in Rodosto Bay. The
steamer was armed, and she was fired upon, and the
only question with regard to her is whether she \Vas
destroyed. I will deal with that as a question of fact.
It does not raise any matter of principle; she \Vas undoubtedly an armed vessel of the enemy. [His lordship
held on the evidence that the steamer was destroyed.]
The question against the claim in respect of the sailing
craft is that they were being convoyed in the n1anner in
which vessels are convoyed in time of war. The commander says in his affidavit that the crews of the steamer
and the sailing ships abandoned their ships, and that
"immediately the crews of the sailing vessels reached the
shore they opened fire upon me with rifles, which said
rifles I verily believe had been taken by the said crews
from on board the said steamer and the said sailing
vessels. Owing to the said rifle fire I \Vas forced to keep
2,000 yards from the said steamer and sailing vessels
when engaged in destroying them. The crews of the
said steamer and the said sailing vessels kept up a heavy
fire upon me for about 30 minutes, when the battery at
Erekli Point, about 5,000 yards distant, opened fire upon
me; an enemy destroyer then appearing forced me to
dive and to abandon the task of destroying the remaining two sailing vessels." Commander ~ox, in respect
of the proceedings on October 5, says: "The cre-\VS of the
said steamer and the said sailing vessels landed at \Videly
divergent points, and froln each of the said points at
which the crews of the various vessels landed, and froln
nowhere else, there im1nediately came an intense rifle
fire, causing the E. 12 to stand off to a distance ot 2,000
yards \Vhilst the work of destruction of the said stean1er
and the said sailing vessels \Vas completed. From the
intensity of the fire opened upon E. 12 I verily believe
that there \Vere at least 50 persons firing upon us." He
corroborates Commander Bruce as to the other incidents.
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The facts I have stated are the materials on which I
have to come to a conclusion whether these sailing vessels
were armed vessels of the enemy. At the hearing I
found it a perplexing task. There was a simple set of
facts with very rudimentary information, and the inquiry is a serious one in point of principle. The amount of
money involved here is not serious, but it is a serious
thing to come to the conclusion, with regard to merchant
vessels carrying men on board with arms, that they are
to be taken by reason of that fact to be armed vessels of the se1"s.~,rmed vesenemy. It involves considerations quite outside those
relative to the subject of naval prize bounty; it affects
the 'vhole status of persons engaged in commerce in time
of war.
It was argued with regard to the sailing vessels that
they were not shown to be armed vessels of the enemy,
and at any rate, as it stood on the evidence, that they
'vere not armed vessels \Vhen they were sunk. If, however, they were armed vessels when they were engaged
it \vould take a great deal of argument to persuade me
that I ought to assume that they had ceased to be armed
vessels because certain men had left them \vith their
boats and taken certain weapons. I should not decide
the case upon any such ground as that; I think it 'vould
give too· restricted an operation to rights intended to be
created by the naval prize act, and would introduce a
fine point of law into what is really a broad question of
fact. If the vessels \Vere armed vessels at all I should be
ready to find that they \Vere armed vessels at the time
that they were sunk. Were they armed vessels~ There
is no evidence that they had any mounted arms or that
they had been fitted for naval warfare, but the authorities
have acquiesced for some time in the view that that is not
conclusive. Manned by men instructed in the use of
and armed with rifles, they were vessels sufficiently
armed to have sunk submarines. Submarines had to
keep 2,000 yards away from the shore because of the risk
of being sunk, and I come to the conclusion that these
"~ere at all n1aterial times armed vessels.
The next question is whether they 'vere armed vessels "<?,! the eneof the enemy. I have said enough on the question of my.
their being found w:ith munitions, or material for the
manufacture of munitions, on board, as to 'vhether that
would be sufficient to make them armed vessels of the
enemy. I do not find that it 'vould. But I must look
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further than that. I must try to see whether these
vessels had been taken up by the Turkish authorities
and taken under their control, and put in a position for
offensive or defensive operations as part of the service of
the forces afloat engaged in the military service of the
Ottoman Government. It is true that I have not much
information, but I am struck, and the more I have
reflected on it I have been the more struck, with the
action of the crews of the several vessels on the several
occasions as to which I have had evidence. On each_
occasion these men, V\rho, on the hypothesis presented
against the claim, are only seamen whose chief concern
is to make their trip and to make it in safety, do not
scatter and get out of the way, do not get into their
boats and put up a flag or signal of some kind, but each
vessel sends out an armed crew, positions are taken up
along the shore, and rifle fire is opened upon the submarine and maintained, in the first instance until the
operation of sinking these vessels is complete, and in the
second instance until a fort at a distance of 2% naval
miles opens fire upon the submarine, and a Turkish
destroyer approaches with the probability of sinking the
submarine. Is that like the conduct of merchant seamen engaged in commercial traffic? I can not conceive
that it is. I have the strongest possible suspicion,
amounting in fact to conviction, that these men did
what they were there to do. I do not regard the naval
arrangements of the Turkish administration as I 'vould
regard the naval arrangements of an administration with
a highly organized naval service, like those of the great
European powers; it is not the same thing at all. On
the hypothesis, a party of merchantmen are earning their
daily bread on the sea, and yet they behave on successive
occasions in the manner I have indicated, sho,ving that
they were an effective belligerent force. They engaged
this submarine and might very well have sunk it. What
does that mean~ I should have had a very definite
suspicion as to what it meant without the affidavit of
Sir Oswyn Murray, "\vho spoke of this transaction as an
"engagement," although the term is not used in any
technical sense, but merely by 'vay of description. I
think he was perfectly accurate, and that there was an
engagement, fought by armed ships 'vhich had been
taken under the control of the Turkish administration
by some means best kno"\vn to themselves, and that these
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had become armed vessels of the Turkish administration.
But there is something more. Admiral de Robeck,
before Commander Bruce and his comrades set out on
this expedition, told them that certain craft "\Vere to be
sunk. Nobody can suppose for a moment that an officer
in His Majesty's service 'vould be told to sink mere
merchant ships, even though they were carrying contraband. What does it mean? I have nothing beyond the
plain evidence of the officers, and it seems to me that I
must take it that these vessels, which were replenishing
the stores of the arsenals and munition factories on the
Sea of 1\1armora, v1ere provided for in the way of defense
by the Government which was using them, and that the
practically certain consequence of the approach of a
submarine was that they "\vould endeavor to sink her by
the various means with which they '\Vere supplied. That
seems to me to be a strong circumstance in this case.
1'here is much which is left to conjecture and presumption, but on the best consideration I can give to the case,
and with no disposition to e·nlarge the provisions of the
naval prize act by any careless consideration as to '\vhat
are the circumstances under which prize bounty arises,
I find that these sailing vessels were armed vessels of
the ·enemy.
There will be an award of prize bounty in the sun1
claimed, £500.
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